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RESPONSE
Go West, Young Woman! The Mercer
Girls and Legal Historiography
Kristin A. Collins∗
I.
II.

“INTO A SPACE BEYOND THE BOUNDS OF CIVILIZATION” ....... 79
“BRING A SUITABLE WIFE” ................................................... 82

In the mid-1860s, Washington Territory’s entrepreneurial Asa
Shinn Mercer endeavored to bring hundreds of young women from the
East Coast to the tiny frontier town of Seattle as prospective brides for
men who had settled there as fishermen, fur traders, and miners. The
much-mythologized “Mercer Girls” story was a natural fit for the
romantic-comedy genre, and was most famously memorialized in the
1954 musical film Seven Brides for Seven Brothers and the television
sitcom series of the late 1960s Here Come the Brides. A few popular
histories have been written about the Mercer Girls, but until now
their experiences have received little serious attention as a subject of
legal or historical significance.
Professor Kerry Abrams’s article The Hidden Dimension of
Nineteenth-Century Immigration Law has changed that. Likely to the
surprise of immigration law scholars, Abrams frames her account of
Asa Mercer’s venture as a story about immigration law history. In so
doing, she offers us a capacious conception of immigration law’s form
and function—one that contemplates the many ways that federal,
state, and territorial law was used in the nineteenth century to
encourage the production of a particular kind of citizenry. 1 By
reconstructing the Mercer Girls’ westward migration as a story about
immigration law, Abrams acknowledges that she risks anachronism: it
is not clear that easterners who moved to the western territories in
∗
Associate Professor of Law and Peter Paul Development Professor, Boston University . I
thank Gerry Leonard and Kerry Abrams for comments on an earlier draft of this Response.
1.
Kerry Abrams, The Hidden Dimension of Nineteenth-Century Immigration Law, 62
VAND. L. REV. 1353, 1356 (2009).
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the nineteenth century, such as the Mercer Girls, understood
themselves as “immigrants” in the sense that term is used today. 2
Nevertheless, Abrams’s approach sheds important light on the
historical record, enabling her to usefully connect ostensibly unrelated
strands of the law’s operation on the nineteenth-century American
“frontier.” It is those insights that I focus on in this Response.
The primary goal of this Response is to locate The Hidden
Dimension within American legal historiography, and particularly
that branch of American legal historiography traceable to the work of
Willard Hurst. American legal historians need no introduction to
Hurst’s intellectual legacy. But I hazard a guess that many readers of
The Hidden Dimension—a significant number of whom will come to
Abrams’s article from the field of immigration or citizenship law—will
lack such background. What is to be gained from such a reading?
There is certainly no imperative that modern legal scholars writing in
any field continually pay homage to Hurst. 3 Indeed, it is a welcome
sign that, in certain respects, the field of legal history has moved
beyond many of the concerns that animated Hurst’s important work,
or has come to see them in a different light. Nevertheless, reading The
Hidden Dimension in light of Hurst’s intellectual legacy is instructive.
Hurst and Abrams both analyze the law’s operation on the same
sociolegal terrain—the nineteenth-century “American frontier”—and
wrestle with many of the same fundamental questions about law’s
relationship to society.
However, Abrams has produced an account of the Mercer Girls
story that is most un-Hurstian in a fundamental respect. Hurst is
often identified with the Cold War-era consensus school—a group of
scholars who, in varying degrees, predicated their study of American
history on the existence of a shared national vision and purpose. 4 By
recounting the tale of the Mercer Girls as a story about immigration
and nation building, Abrams denaturalizes such assumptions.
Instead, she uncovers a microhistory that speaks volumes regarding
2.
Id. at 1362.
3.
Hurst is possibly the most celebrated American legal historian, living or dead, if judged
purely by the number of law review volumes and articles dedicated to his work. For law review
volumes, see Law & Society in American History: Essays in Honor of J. Willard Hurst, 10 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 5 (1975); Tributes to James Willard Hurst, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 1123; Engaging Willard
Hurst: A Symposium, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 (2000). The freestanding articles written
specifically about or in response to Hurst’s scholarship are too numerous to list. The University
of Wisconsin Law School, where Hurst was a law professor for his entire academic career,
maintains a list of such articles on its website. See University of Wisconsin Law School, Works
about J. Willard Hurst, http://www.law.wisc.edu/ils/works_about_hurst.htm (last visited May 4,
2010).
4.
See discussion accompanying infra notes 12 - 18.
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the law’s role in constituting a white, Christian American citizenry in
the West—one that included white women as subordinated but
fundamental participants in that nation-building project. Seen in this
light, the Mercer Girls story that Abrams excavates is not only a
chapter in immigration law history; it is also a part of the history of
law’s colonizing function in the American West.
I. “INTO A SPACE BEYOND THE BOUNDS OF CIVILIZATION”
Willard Hurst’s famed monograph, Law and the Conditions of
Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States, famously opens
with the story of Jason Lothrop and the Pike River Claimants’ Union.
Lothrop was a settler in Wisconsin Territory in 1836, just after
Wisconsin became a territory but several years before the federal
government’s Land Office surveyed the territory for orderly allocation.
Hurst tells us that Lothrop “set up on a stump a rude press of his own
construction and with ink which he had made himself printed a
handbill setting forth the record of the organizational meeting of ‘The
Pike River Claimants Union . . . for the attainment and security of
titles to claims on Government lands.’ ” 5 In that document, members
of the union purportedly declared themselves to be “well meaning
inhabitants” of the territory who had “advance[d] into a space beyond
the bounds of civilization,” and who now had a shared interest in
“regulating the manner of making and sustaining claims” on the lands
they occupied. They further declared their interest in protecting their
homes and property from “unprincipled and avarice men,” and to that
end “solemnly pledg[ed] ourselves to render each other our mutual
assistance in the protection of our just rights.” 6
For Hurst, the Pike River Claimants’ Union’s constitution, and
the circumstances of its production, “reflect[ed] in miniature”
important aspects of the operation of law in nineteenth-century
America. One of the central tenets of the Hurstian approach was that,
in the hands of men like Lothrop, the law was not a force of regulatory
oppression, as many of his Cold War-era contemporaries contended.
Responding to the “myth of the Golden Age” of the nineteenth century,
in which “our ancestors” made do without elaborate regulatory
regimes, Hurst explained that “legal regulation [or] compulsion” was a
fundamental part of nineteenth-century society. In a now-famous
sentence, Hurst declared the importance of law to socioeconomic
5.
JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTHCENTURY UNITED STATES 3 (1956).
6.
Id. at 4.
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development in the nineteenth century: “Not the jealous limitation of
the power of the state, but the release of individual creative energy
was the dominant value.” 7 Men like Lothrop used law to their material
advantage, and it was that instrumental function of law that
captivated Hurst’s critical attention.
Abandoning the doctrinal, court-focused nature of early
twentieth-century legal historiography, Hurst radically expanded
legal historians’ institutional focus. “[T]here is more danger,” he
observed, “that we shall exaggerate than that we shall underestimate,
the place of the courts in United States legal history.” 8 He insisted
that the study of legal history should instead encompass “lawmakers”
in all branches of government—legislative, executive, and judicial.
Hurst was also interested in understanding the law “as it had
meaning for workaday people and was shaped by them to their wants
and vision.” 9 This led him to stretch well beyond legal sources
generated by official legal institutions to include documents like the
constitution of the Pike River Claimants’ Union.
In short, Hurst advocated, and developed a program for, the
sociological study of law in all of its manifestations—federal and local,
legislative and administrative, in-the-books and on-the-street. Thanks
to Hurst, legal history came to be viewed as central to the
understanding of American history more generally. 10 As Aviam Soifer
and others rightly insist, “[O]ur basic approach to legal history still
builds on the background theory initially sketched and then realized
by Hurst.” 11 Whether consciously or not, Abrams writes legal history
in an intellectual world at least partly crafted by Hurst.
But not completely so. There has been considerable debate
concerning whether Hurst was part of the consensus school of
American history—a group of midcentury historians credited with
perpetuating the notion that American society was united by values
and norms widely shared among the population. 12 One need not
7.
Id. at 7.
8.
JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 86 (1950).
9.
HURST, supra note 5, at 5.
10. For example, in the first footnote to her important 1986 book Women and the Law of
Property in Early America, Marylynn Salmon—writing from an appointment in a history
department—noted that “the move to study law and social forces together began, of course,
under the direction of Willard Hurst at the University of Wisconsin Law School.” MARYLYNN
SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 195 n.1 (1986).
11. Aviam Soifer, Reflections on the 40th Anniversary of Hurst’s Growth of American Law,
17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 167, 172 (1992).
12. The question of whether Hurst was a consensus historian has generated considerable
debate. Compare Mark Tushnet, Lumber and the Legal Process, 1972 WIS. L. REV. 114, 118
(discussing Hurst as a consensus historian), and Carl Landauer, Social Science on a Lawyer’s
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resolve this debate to recognize that, at the very least on the level of
rhetoric and style, Hurst’s writing is characterized by his curious and,
today, distracting use of the pronouns “we” and “our”: “[W]e had no
hesitancy in making affirmative use of law.” 13 “We were concerned
with protecting private property chiefly for what it could do.” 14 “Our
prime inheritance was a middle-class way of thinking.” 15 “We were a
people going places in a hurry. Men in that frame of mind are not
likely to be thinking only of the condition of their breaks.” 16 As the last
quotation suggests, Hurst’s legal subjects—those “workaday people”
who harnessed law’s potential in maximizing “material
productivity”—were generally men. More precisely, they were white
men operating to a considerable degree in the condition of freedom.
As Barbara Welke and others have observed, the conditions of
“unfreedom” that were the lived reality of the law for many early
nineteenth-century “workaday people”—especially women and people
of color—were not central to Hurst’s project. 17 Women, African
Americans, Native Americans, and Asian Americans play extremely
minor roles in his historiographical legal drama. 18 On the one hand,
this is hardly surprising given that Hurst’s formative intellectual
years were spent in a legal academic culture dominated by white men,
many of whom were preoccupied with the New Deal and the economic
disaster that precipitated it. 19 On the other hand, the seismic
sociolegal contests and transformations that occurred over the course
Bookshelf: Willard Hurst’s Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century
United States, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 59, 67 (2000) (“Hurst writes not to illuminate class, racial,
gender, or other conflict but to depict a shared culture.”), with William Novak, Law, Capitalism,
and the Liberal State: The Historical Sociology of James Willard Hurst, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 97,
109 (2000) (“When Hurst talked about shared values and institutions, he was not talking about
the absence of conscious and willed contest and struggle . . . .”), and Soifer, supra note 11, at 168
(challenging the characterization of Hurst as a consensus historian and urging instead that
“Hurst tells a tale of dissensus”). My goal in this Response is not to resolve this debate. It is
sufficient for present purposes to recognize the strands of consensus-school rhetoric and
reasoning that are present in Hurst’s work.
13. HURST, supra note 5, at 7.
14. Id. at 24.
15. Id. at 7.
16. Id. at 9.
17. Barbara Y. Welke, Willard Hurst and the Archipelago of American Legal
Historiography, Archipelago, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 197, 201 (2000); Mary Frances Berry, New
Directions for the Children of Hurst, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 177, 178-80 (2000).
18. This is not to suggest that Hurst completely ignored such concerns. Nevertheless, Hurst
did go so far as to suggest that women’s legal rights, as well as the rights of slaves and freedmen,
were marginal to the central operation of law in the nineteenth century. See Hurst, supra note 5,
at 29, 97. For a similar observation, see Stephen Diamond, Legal Realism and Historical Method:
J. Willard Hurst and American Legal History, 77 MICH. L. REV. 784, 786 (1978).
19. Welke, supra note 17, at 199-200.

Collins_Page.docx (Do Not Delete)

82

7/2/2010 3:24 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW EN BANC

[Vol. 63: 77

of Hurst’s very productive legal academic career included, most
prominently, the civil rights movement and the women’s rights
movement. By the 1970s, while Hurst was still actively writing, the
culture in the academy was rapidly changing. Writing about the
“frontier” as a world of “unclaimed natural abundance” that men like
Jason Lothrop harnessed using law’s entrepreneurial potential was
already dated and suspect.
II. “BRING A SUITABLE WIFE”
Abrams also writes about the law’s operation in the
nineteenth-century American West. And, writing in an intellectual
tradition shaped not in small part by Hurst, she tells a story that
illuminates the sometimes invisible ways that law shapes and is
shaped by social and ideological norms. She mines a historical record
that would make Hurst proud, dominated as it is by territorial, state,
and federal legislative reports, newspaper articles, letters, diary
entries, and contracts. (Judicial opinions constitute a relatively small
portion of Abrams’s evidence.) She, like Hurst, is sensitive to the law’s
long shadow, and the myriad ways that law’s power—both regulatory
and rhetorical—is captured in “workaday” documents.
If there is one document that reflects in miniature the role of
law in Abrams’s account of the Mercer Girls story it is Asa Mercer’s
1864 contract with an unknown number of men in Seattle:
I, Asa Mercer, of Seattle, Washington Territory, hereby agree to bring a suitable wife, of
good moral character and reputation from the East to Seattle on or before September
1865, for each of the parties whose signatures are hereunto attached, they first paying
me or my agent the sum of three hundred dollars, with which to pay the passage of said
ladies from the East and to compensate me for my trouble. 20

Like the founding document of the Pike River Claimants’ Union,
Mercer’s contract with the brideless men of Seattle serves as a lens
into the ways that nineteenth-century Americans attempted to
harness law’s power in an effort to “realize their creative energy.” 21
And, like Lothrop’s handpress-printed constitution of the Claimants’
Union, Mercer’s contract for the delivery of marriageable women “from
the East to Seattle” is part of a larger project of legal settlement: the
use of law to “civilize” the frontier. Finally, like Lothrop’s constitution,
which memorialized the vigilante intentions of a group of settlersquatters operating at the margin of lawfulness, Mercer’s contract-for20. Clarence B. Bagley, “The Mercer Immigration:” Two Cargoes of Maidens for the Sound
Country, 5 OR. HIST. SOC’Y Q. 1, 23-24 (1904) (quoted in Abrams, supra note 1, at 1367).
21. HURST, supra note 5, at 6.
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wives also pushed the boundaries of contemporary legal norms. While
Abrams carefully notes that the trafficking of women would not
become a subject of criminal proscription for several decades, there
was certainly some concern that the Mercer Girls were being
transported to Seattle for less-than-respectable purposes. 22
Although Hurst and Abrams both focus on early nineteenthcentury legal entrepreneurs who made “affirmative use of law” to
create a “new kind of society,” their subjects and their projects part
company in significant ways. Lothrop and the workaday people who
were the focus of Hurst’s attention were white men bent on using law
to exploit natural resources for profit. Mercer was certainly interested
in maximizing his individual wealth and material well-being through
opportunistic use of law, but his project capitalized on a set of social
imperatives and legal regulations that occupied little of Hurst’s
attention: the sociolegal regulation of women. Hurst considered in
passing married women’s property acts, women’s suffrage, and the
laws regulating women’s working conditions, 23 but women’s lived
experience of the law would not figure prominently in the work of
historians until the 1970s and 1980s. Working largely from academic
appointments in history departments, historians—including Linda
Kerber, Nancy Cott, Marylynn Salmon, Joan Hoff Wilson, and Norma
Basch—brought much needed attention to the legal status of women
in American history. 24 Legal historians writing from appointments in
law schools soon joined in, and mainstream law reviews slowly began
publishing articles that focused on the various ways that the law had

22. Abrams, supra note 1, at 1379.
23. See, e.g., HURST, supra note 5, at 14, 24, 30; HURST, supra note 8, at 186, 238, 255, 358.
This is not to suggest, however, that Hurst was uninterested in the history of the legal
regulation of women and women’s rights. In the mid-1960s, he supervised a LLM thesis on the
married women’s property acts. See Kay Ellen Thurman, The Married Women’s Property Acts
(1966) (unpublished LLM Thesis, Univ. of Wisc. School of Law).
24. See, e.g., Linda K. Kerber, The Republican Mother-Women and the Enlightenment: An
American Perspective, 28 AM. Q. 1987 (1976); Nancy F. Cott, Divorce and the Changing Status of
Women in Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts, 33 WM. & MARY Q. 586 (1976); Norma Basch,
Invisible Women: The Legal Fiction of Marital Unity in Nineteenth-Century America, 5 FEMINIST
STUD. 346 (1979); Joan Hoff Wilson, The Legal Status of Women in the Late Nineteenth and Early
Twentieth Centuries, 6 HUM. RTS. 125 (1977); Marylynn Salmon, The Legal Status of Women in
Early America: A Reappraisal, 1 LAW & HIST. REV. 129 (1983). This list is illustrative, not
exhaustive. Certainly historians were writing about law’s role in shaping women’s lives before
the 1970s, but not with regularity and not always in published form. For example, Elizabeth
Warbasse’s widely cited pathbreaking PhD dissertation at Radcliffe College, The Changing Legal
Rights of Married Women 1800-1861 (Radcliffe, 1960), remained unpublished until 1987, when it
was published in its original typescript format after having become an “underground classic.”
ELIZABETH BOWLES WARBASSE, THE CHANGING LEGAL RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN, 1800-1861,
np (1987).
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regulated women’s lives. 25 By the late 1990s, “the woman question”
had become “the gender question” and had animated an extremely
fruitful line of legal historical inquiry. 26
What this enormous body of scholarship has revealed is not
just that legal historians of earlier generations missed out on an
important dimension of the sociological operation of law in nineteenthcentury America. It has also revealed that a full account of the law’s
role in the boom of material growth and productivity of the nineteenth
century—that aspect of laws’ regulatory force and potential that
captured
Hurst’s
attention—cannot
be
rendered
without
understanding the sociolegal construction of gender. In this regard,
recent scholarship—including John Witt on nineteenth-century
developments in tort law and workmen’s compensation, Barbara
Welke on gender and railroad regulation, Amy Dru Stanley on the
marriage contract and contract law more generally, and Reva Siegel
on married women’s claims to their own earnings—has demonstrated
the various ways that the sociolegal construction of gender and family
was not separate from, but rather was integral to, nineteenth-century
America’s explosive political and economic development. 27
Abrams’s account of the Mercer Girls story continues in that
tradition, demonstrating in concrete ways that the laws and policies
governing the interstate (and state-to-territory) movement of persons,
marriage, and marital property were shaped by a perceived need for
white women’s civilizing influence in the West. Drawing together
25. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning
Wives’ Household Labor, 1850–1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994) [hereinafter “Siegel, Home as
Work”]; Carolyn C. Jones, Dollars and Selves: Women’s Tax Criticism and Resistance in the
1870s, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 265; Jane E. Larson, “Women Understand So Little, They Call My
Good Nature ‘Deceit’ ”: A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 381-412
(1993); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation
and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992); Lea S. VanderVelde, The
Gendered Origins of the Lumley Doctrine: Binding Men’s Consciences and Women's Fidelity, 101
YALE L.J. 775 (1992); Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800–1850, 71 GEO.
L.J. 1359 (1983).
26. See, e.g., Michael Grossberg, Institutionalizing Masculinity: The Law as a Masculine
Profession, in MEANINGS FOR MANHOOD: CONSTRUCTIONS OF MASCULINITY IN VICTORIAN
AMERICA (Carnes & Griffin, eds., 1990); Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An
Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221 (1999); Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal
History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 957 (2000); Rogers M. Smith, “One United
People”: Second-Class Female Citizenship and the American Quest for Community, 1 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 229 (1989). Again, this list is illustrative, not exhaustive.
27. See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN,
DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2004); BARBARA YOUNG WELKE,
RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY: GENDER, RACE, LAW, AND THE RAILROAD REVOLUTION, 1865-1920
(2001); AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE
MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998); Siegel, Home as Work, supra note 25.
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seemingly unrelated episodes, Abrams shows how Mercer’s
entrepreneurial effort to bring white women to Seattle was part of a
larger sociolegal trend. For example, the federal government promoted
the settlement of white women through two significant midnineteenth-century land-donation statutes, the Donation Land Act
and the Homestead Act. 28 State and territorial woman suffrage laws,
as well as acts proscribing certain forms of sex discrimination, were
enacted at least in part to induce white women to move west. 29 In
other words, at least a small portion of the “conditions of freedom”
that had been granted to white men in the early nineteenth century
became part of white women’s bundle of rights in the West, at least in
certain states and territories. 30
Abrams’s account of the various ways that the law was used to
encourage migration to the West is completely consistent with Hurst’s
insistence that there was nothing “lawless” about the American
frontier in the nineteenth century. 31 Indeed, Abrams’s emphasis on
“the productive role of law” could be drawn straight from a volume
penned by Hurst, except that Abrams is concerned not with the law’s
role facilitating material production but, rather, its role facilitating
the production and reproduction of a particular kind of citizenry. In
this regard, the adjective “white” in the foregoing paragraph deserves
emphasis. Not all women were given access (albeit limited) to
government allocations of property and suffrage, and not all women
were targeted as future wives, mothers, and teachers. Abrams
properly focuses on the law’s role as a tool to encourage white women’s
westward migration and, in so doing, illuminates the important role of
race in the immigration story she tells. As Abrams makes very clear,
Mercer’s entrepreneurial motivations were racially preconditioned.
Mercer responded to, and capitalized on, the fear among white settlers
that white men in Seattle were marrying Native American women,
becoming “Klootchman lovers.” 32

28. Abrams, supra note 1, at 1404-05 (discussing the Oregon Donation Act and the
Homestead Act, both of which required land claimants to be “white”).
29. Abrams, supra note 1, 1406-07.
30. Let there be no confusion here—Abrams makes very clear that the careful regulation
and limitation of married women’s rights through coverture were alive and well in the West, and
that the default common-law regime was one of the conditions that made the Mercer Girls
venture possible. Precisely because the Mercer Girls were understood as “wives”—wives whose
husbands would be legally liable for their support and for the support of their offspring—they
need not be excluded through the then standard means of immigrant exclusion. See id. at 139091.
31. HURST, supra note 5, at 4.
32. Abrams, supra note 1, at 1363, 1391, 1401, 1409-11.
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Lest one think the story of race in the Mercer Girls story is a
tale of how the law of contract could be harnessed to further the ends
of private racial bias and preference, Abrams’s account quickly dispels
any such misunderstanding by weaving the Mercer Girls story into a
larger historical narrative concerning the western territories’ quests
for statehood. In order to qualify for statehood, a territory had to
demonstrate that its inhabitants were predisposed toward “the
principles of democracy as exemplified in the American form of
government.” 33 That official policy promoted the proliferation of
statutes banning interracial marriage, 34 while also setting the stage
for Asa Mercer’s travels east to Massachusetts to recruit white women
for his westward migration. As with gender, race was not marginal to
the story of nineteenth-century development of the American West.
Rather, it was part of the fabric of law that permeated the kinds of
social and economic enterprises that were the focus of Hurst’s work—a
point that has been thoroughly illustrated over the last several
decades by legal historians writing about the experiences of nonwhites
in America. 35
As the foregoing account shows, gender and race are
intertwined in Abrams’s sociolegal history of the Mercer Girls, and
they are intertwined in ways that lead us back to Abrams’s central
organizing themes: immigration and how law was used to create a
“nation by design.” 36 In this respect, The Hidden Dimension is part of
a body of scholarship focused on the legal history of immigration and
citizenship in the United States that began to take shape in the 1950s
and 1960s, and the much more recent body of historiography that
focuses on the law’s particular role in shaping women’s claims to
citizenship. Historians have been keenly interested in immigration
and citizenship for many decades, 37 but in the late 1980s the relatively

33. Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787, art. V, in Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50
(1789) (cited in Abrams, supra note 1, at 1401 n.241).
34. Abrams, supra note 1, at 1411-12 (noting that “in all cases but Oregon, an antimiscegenation law was passed within three years of obtaining territorial status, often in
conjunction with the territory’s organic act”).
35. See Berry, supra note 17, at 178 (noting that the problem is not simply that Hurst
overlooked slavery, but that “Hurst could not validly ignore the impact of slavery as an economic
institution in an analysis of any aspect of the antebellum economy”). Two very recent examples
of such scholarship are LEA VANDERVELDE, MRS. DRED SCOTT: A LIFE ON SLAVERY’S FRONTIER
(2009); LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA
DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS (2005).
36. Abrams, supra note 1, at 1357 (quoting ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN:
IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE FASHIONING OF AMERICA (2006)).
37. See, e.g., OSCAR HANDLIN, BOSTON’S IMMIGRANTS, 1790–1865: A STUDY IN
ACCULTURATION (1941); OSCAR HANDLIN, THE NEWCOMERS: NEGROES AND PUERTO RICANS IN A
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young field of women’s history consciously embraced citizenship as an
important focus. In 1989, a star-studded cast of historians convened at
a roundtable discussion to consider new directions for the study of
gender as a historical phenomenon. In their remarks, both Linda
Kerber and Nancy Cott noted the importance of the concept of
citizenship as a framework—legal and rhetorical—through which men
and women negotiated their relationships with the state in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 38 Soon after that roundtable,
Kerber and Cott each produced important articles and books
illuminating the paradoxes of women’s citizenship, and the central
role of marriage to the production of “the people.” 39 In the same
period, scholars from different disciplines—including, but by no means
limited to, Candice Bredbenner, Mae Ngai, Rogers Smith, and Martha
Gardner—made clear that women’s experience as both tools for, and
as participants in, the creation of a particular kind of American polity
deserved far more attention than it had received from earlier
generations of historians. 40
What all of these works have illuminated, and what The
Hidden Dimension further reveals at the level of microhistory, is that
there may indeed have been a “we” that spanned the temporal arc
from the nineteenth-century America of which Hurst wrote to midtwentieth-century America during which Hurst wrote. However, the
“we” that shared a common understanding of sociolegal norms and
values was not an a priori natural or social collective that existed
separate from law’s ordering principles, as Hurst seemed to intimate.
Rather, Hurst’s “we” was itself a product of the law in both its
CHANGING METROPOLIS (1959); JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
NATIVISM, 1860-1925 (1955).
38. Linda K. Kerber, et al., Forum: Beyond Roles, Beyond Spheres: Thinking About Gender
in the Early Republic 46 WM. & MARY Q. 456 (1989) (forum discussion featuring Linda K. Kerber,
Nancy F. Cott, Robert Gross, Lynn Hunt, Carol Smith-Rosenberg, Christine M. Stansell).
39. NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 5 (2000);
LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP (1998); Nancy F. Cott, Marriage and Women’s Citizenship in the United States,
1830-1934, 103 AM. HIST. REV. 1440 (1998); Linda K. Kerber, The Paradox of Women's
Citizenship in the Early Republic: The Case of Martin v. Massachusetts, 1805, 97 AM. HIST. REV.
349 (1992).
40. CANDICE LEWIS BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND
THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP (1998); MARTHA GARDNER: THE QUALITIES OF A CITIZEN: WOMEN,
IMMIGRATION, AND CITIZENSHIP, 1870-1965 (2005); MAE NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL
ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2004); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS:
CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997); Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship:
On Asian American History and the Loss of Citizenship through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405
(2005). I have also considered some of these issues. See Kristin A. Collins, Note, When Fathers’
Rights Were Mothers’ Duties: The Failure of Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright, 109 YALE L.J.
1669 (2000).
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entrepreneurial and its regulatory forms. It was a “we” crafted
through law’s various manifestations—violent, coercive, and
rhetorical—from the halls of Congress, the Massachusetts state house,
and the territorial assembly of Washington, to the extemporaneous
constitutions of associations (like the Pike River Claimants’ Union)
and the private agreement between Asa Mercer and the brideless men
of Seattle. That “we” also engaged in other activities—lawful and at
least nominally unlawful—intended to shape the population of the
western states and territories by relocating, exploiting, and
exterminating existing populations and by importing nonwhites to
serve as laborers and prostitutes.
Viewed from this perspective, one can see that by retelling the
story of the Mercer Girls as a tale about immigration and immigration
law, Abrams also reveals it to be a story about continental expansion
and the colonization of the American West. 41 This dual valence of the
Mercer Girls venture was cheerfully captured in an 1865 New York
Times headline: “Female Emigration: Women Colonizing the Far
West.” 42 This is the stuff of romantic comedy, to be sure. But there is
also a tragic storyline that winds through Abrams’s account of the
Mercer Girls. The Hidden Dimension is chock-full of evidence of the
law’s colonial aspirations and operations in the nineteenth-century
American West—the ways in which the law was used to bring vast
geographical spaces inhabited by nonwhite others under the control of
the United States government, and to create a racialized sociolegal
hierarchy among the different groups residing there. 43 Thus, the
federal government privileged whites in the allocation of enormous
41. An enormous body of legal scholarship focuses on law and colonialism. See, e.g., Sally
Engle Merry, Law and Colonialism, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 889 (1991) (reviewing several books
excavating the role of law in colonial regimes). Much of the original law and colonialism
scholarship focused on colonialism in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. See Jeffrey R. Dudas,
Law at the American Frontier, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 859, 861 (2004) (reviewing Douglas C.
Harris, FISH, LAW, & COLONIALISM: THE LEGAL CAPTURE OF SALMON IN BRITISH COLUMBIA
(2001)). A more recent wave of law and colonialism scholarship recognizes the history of North
American settlement and westward expansion as fundamentally a colonial enterprise. See
Christopher Tomlins, The Many Legalities of Colonization: A Manifesto of Destiny for Early
American Legal History, in THE MANY LEGALITIES OF EARLY AMERICA 1 (Tomlins & Mann, eds.,
2001); Dudas, supra; Christopher Tomlins, American Legal History in Retrospect and Prospect:
Reflections on the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of Morton Horwitz’s Transformation of American
Law, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1135 (2003); Christopher Tomlins, The Legal Cartography of
Colonization, the Legal Polyphony of Settlement: English Intrusions on the American Mainland
in the Seventeenth Century, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 315 (2001).
42. N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1865, at 8 (cited in Abrams, supra note 1, at 1360 n.18).
43. There is no single description of law’s role in colonial regimes. However, most law and
colonialism scholarship is intent on demonstrating, at base, that law was a means by which
“European colonizers exerted control over Native peoples and their resources.” See Dudas, supra
note 41, at 862.
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quantities of land for settlement. 44 Interracial marriage was simply
banned in many jurisdictions. 45 Elsewhere, intestacy law was used to
invalidate, or at least limit the legal significance of, marriages
between whites and nonwhites by cutting off the inheritance rights of
children of such unions. 46 The law was used to require cultural and, to
a certain extent, religious homogeneity within the new territories and
states. New Mexico’s statehood was conditioned on the banning of
Catholic-controlled public schools and the use of English as the
language of instruction. Similarly, Utah’s statehood was conditioned
on the outlawing of polygamy. 47 In short, the project of colonization
was effected through laws that organized the distribution of land to
privilege white settlers, endowed white settlers with disproportionate
governing power (while also requiring cultural-religious homogeneity),
and relegated nonwhites to a second-class status, or far worse.
Of course, it was not just the instrumental operation of the law
in the western territories that implicated law in a colonial project.
Legal historians and anthropologists who have focused on law’s
operation in colonial settings, including North America, have rightly
noted that colonial law not only allocated property and privilege in a
race-based manner and mandated cultural and linguistic conformity;
law also helped constitute relations between and among different
groups living in colonial societies. 48 Anglo-American legal rules and
discourse simultaneously authorized and gave meaning to particular,
hierarchical relations between and among whites and nonwhites—and
men and women—in the nineteenth-century American West. 49 The
resulting colonial legal consciousness provided the circumstances
under which men like Mercer and Lothrop could and would harness
the law’s power in an effort to further the expansionist process for
private gain. Mercer and Lothrop used phrases like “a space beyond
the bounds of civilization” and “bring a suitable wife” in legal (or
quasilegal) documents with the expectation that their import was
readily apparent to other participants in the colonial project,
44. Abrams, supra note 1, at 1403.
45. Id. at 1412.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1402.
48. This point is made repeatedly in the law and colonialism literature, and with far greater
nuance than can be accomplished in this short Response. See, e.g., Merry, supra note 41, at 892;
John L. Comaroff, Colonialism, Culture, and the Law: A Foreword, 26 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 305,
309 (2001); Dudas, supra note 41, at 864.
49. I focus here on the role of law in North American westward expansion because that is
Abrams’s focus, but the same can be—and has been—said of the role of law in the colonization of
the eastern seaboard in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. See Tomlins, The Legal
Cartography of Colonization, supra note 41.
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including, of course, the Mercer Girls themselves. 50 In this regard,
Abrams builds on and contributes to a robust body of legal
historiography that has revealed the “we” of Hurst’s frontier as at
least in part the product of law’s colonizing force.

50. I am by no means the first to observe the intonations of colonialism in the constitution
of the Lathrop’s Pike River Claimants’ Union. See Tomlins, American Legal History, supra note
41, at 1143; Tomlins, The Many Legalities, supra note 41, at 7-8, 15-17. Notably, at least some of
the women who took part in Mercer’s westward migration recorded their approval of the voyage
as part of an expansionist project. See Abrams, supra note 1, at 1399.

